Licensed in Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas
Licensed in Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas
Much published material on this subject predates the 2024 amendments, and Louisiana changed the rules underneath it. The change is not a detail. It goes to who can be sued and whose name appears on the paperwork.
The short version is that a homeowners policy responds to the owner’s liability rather than creating a separate target, and Louisiana now restricts when an injured person may proceed against the insurer at all.
At Lukov Injury Law, we work from the current text of the statute rather than from the version that circulated for years.
The sections below set out whose liability is at stake, what the direct action statute says now, and how an insurer comes into a case when the ordinary route is closed. Contact us today to talk through what happened.
The owner’s, and Louisiana states that liability in its own article.
La. C.C. art. 2321(B) provides that “the owner of a dog is strictly liable for damages for injuries to persons or property caused by the dog and which the owner could have prevented and which did not result from the injured person’s provocation of the dog.” The article was amended by Acts 2025, No. 488.
A homeowners or renters policy is a contract between the insurer and the policyholder. Whether it responds to a particular incident, and to what extent, depends on the terms of that contract, including its definitions, conditions and any exclusions. That is a question about the policy rather than about the Civil Code, and it is answered by reading the policy rather than by assuming a general rule.
The point that follows is a practical one. In any dog bite claim the starting question is whether the owner is liable under art. 2321(B). Insurance is the mechanism that may respond to that liability, not a separate basis for one.
Not as a matter of course, and this is where older material is now wrong.
La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1) provides that the injured person, or if deceased the persons identified in Civil Code Articles 2315.1 and 2315.2, “shall have no right of direct action against the insurer unless at least one of the following applies.”
That is the default. The right of direct action, which Louisiana was known for, is now the exception rather than the rule. The section was amended by Acts 2024, No. 275, together with Acts 2024, No. 595 and Acts 2024, No. 789.
Anything that describes Louisiana as a state where an injured person may simply name the homeowner’s insurer as a defendant is describing the position before those amendments.
The statute lists seven, and a claim needs at least one of them.
Where one of those exceptions does apply, the next paragraph protects the right it opens. Paragraph B(2) provides that the right of direct action “shall exist whether or not the policy of insurance sued upon was written or delivered in the state of Louisiana and whether or not such policy contains a provision forbidding such direct action, provided the accident or injury occurred within the state of Louisiana.”
Read in place, that paragraph is not a general grant. It stops an out-of-state policy, or a clause in the policy purporting to bar direct action, from defeating a right that one of the seven exceptions has already opened.
Which exception might apply, if any, is a question of fact in each case. The 180-day period in the third item is the one at risk of being misremembered, so it is worth reading from the statute rather than from memory.
The practical shape of the list is worth noticing. Several of the exceptions describe something that happens after a claim has already started, such as a failure of service, a refusal to defend, or a reservation of rights. They are not conditions an injured person can assess before deciding what to do. That is part of why the position on the insurer is established as the case develops rather than settled at the outset, and why the identity of the carrier is worth establishing early even though the carrier may not be a defendant.
Because the statute now says it must not be, and it goes further than that.
La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(4)(a) provides that an insurer “shall not be included in the caption of any action brought against the insurer pursuant to this Section,” and that “the action shall instead be captioned only against the insured defendant or other noninsurance defendants.”
Subparagraph (b) addresses the jury: a court “shall not disclose the existence of insurance coverage to the jury or mention such coverage in the jury’s presence unless required by Code of Evidence Article 411.”
Those two provisions change how a case looks from the outside. A file that is in substance about an insurance policy may carry only the dog owner’s name, and a jury hearing it may never be told that a policy exists.
The statute also preserves the insurer’s position on the merits. Paragraph C provides that any action brought under the section is “subject to all of the lawful conditions of the policy or contract and the defenses which could be urged by the insurer to a direct action brought by the insured,” provided those terms are not in violation of Louisiana law.
There is a route, and it operates at the end of the case rather than at the start.
Under La. R.S. 22:1269(D)(1)(a), in those instances where direct action is not otherwise authorized by law, “at the time that a judgment is to be entered, or a settlement is reached during the pendency of litigation, a liability insurer may be joined on motion of any party as a party defendant for the purposes of entering final judgment or enforcing the settlement.”
That route carries its own conditions. Subparagraph (b) provides that it is subject to the terms and limits of the policy, and that it does not apply if the insurer timely denied coverage or reserved rights under the notice provisions of the section, unless there has been an adjudication in favor of coverage.
The statute also sets out notice machinery, including a certification by counsel for the insured defendant identifying insurers who waive further notice, and requirements on an insurer that denies coverage or reserves rights. Those are procedural mechanics rather than something an injured person handles personally, but they explain why the identity and position of the insurer is established early even when the insurer is not a named defendant.
Two provisions matter here, and they work in the injured person’s favor.
La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(3) provides that “the filing of an action against the insured shall interrupt prescription as to all insurers whose policies provide coverage for the claims asserted in the action.” An action properly brought against the dog owner therefore reaches the insurers behind that claim for prescription purposes.
Separately, La. C.C. art. 2324(C) provides that interruption of prescription against one joint tortfeasor is effective against all joint tortfeasors, which matters where more than one person was responsible for the animal.
One consequence is worth stating plainly for anyone weighing whether to act. Because the interruption in B(3) is triggered by filing against the insured, the step that protects the position against the insurers is the ordinary one of bringing the claim against the dog owner. There is no separate action to take against a carrier, and no need to identify one before the claim is brought.
The underlying period is the general one. La. C.C. art. 3493.1, enacted by Acts 2024, No. 423 and effective July 1, 2024, sets a liberative prescription of two years for delictual actions, running “from the day that injury or damage is sustained.” Which period governs a particular claim depends on when the cause of action arose, so confirm the position with a lawyer.
Fault sharing applies to the underlying claim in the ordinary way. Under La. C.C. art. 2323, as amended by Acts 2025, No. 15 effective January 1, 2026, an injured person whose share of negligence is fifty-one percent or more is not entitled to recover, and below that figure the recovery is reduced in proportion.
Three things follow from the current text: the claim runs against the owner, the insurer is reached only through a listed exception or through the joinder route at the end, and the insurer’s name may never appear on the caption. None of that is how Louisiana worked before 2024, which is why a dog bite file benefits from being built against the statute in its current form. At Lukov Injury Law, that is where we start.
You work directly with Abby Lukov, not a case manager, and the first conversation costs nothing. Call us today to talk through the incident and what coverage may sit behind it.
Not as a matter of course. La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1) provides that the injured person shall have no right of direct action against the insurer unless at least one of seven listed circumstances applies. The section was amended by Acts 2024, No. 275, along with Acts 2024, No. 595 and Acts 2024, No. 789.
The statute lists the insured filing for bankruptcy or bankruptcy proceedings being commenced, the insured being insolvent, service of process having been attempted without success or the insured refusing to answer or defend within one hundred eighty days of service, causes of action between children and their parents or between married persons, the insurer being an uninsured motorist carrier, the insured being deceased, and the insurer defending under a reservation of rights or denying coverage, the last only for the purpose of establishing coverage.
No. La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(4)(a) provides that an insurer shall not be included in the caption of any action brought against the insurer under the section, and that the action shall instead be captioned only against the insured defendant or other noninsurance defendants.
Not ordinarily. La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(4)(b) provides that a court shall not disclose the existence of insurance coverage to the jury or mention such coverage in the jury’s presence unless required by Code of Evidence Article 411.
There is a route at the end of the case. La. R.S. 22:1269(D)(1)(a) provides that where direct action is not otherwise authorized, an insurer may be joined on motion of any party at the time judgment is to be entered or a settlement is reached, for the purposes of entering final judgment or enforcing the settlement. That route is subject to the terms and limits of the policy and to the conditions in the following subparagraph.
La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(3) provides that the filing of an action against the insured interrupts prescription as to all insurers whose policies provide coverage for the claims asserted in the action. Separately, La. C.C. art. 2324(C) provides that interruption of prescription against one joint tortfeasor is effective against all joint tortfeasors.
A policy is a contract, so whether it responds to a particular incident and to what extent depends on its terms, including its definitions, conditions and any exclusions. The Civil Code establishes the owner’s liability under art. 2321(B). Whether insurance answers for that liability is a separate question decided by the policy.
La. C.C. art. 3493.1 sets a liberative prescription of two years for delictual actions, running from the day that injury or damage is sustained. It was enacted by Acts 2024, No. 423, effective July 1, 2024. Which period governs a particular claim depends on when the cause of action arose, so the position should be confirmed with a lawyer rather than taken from a general figure.
Disclaimer: This article provides general information and should not be treated as legal advice. Laws change over time, and outcomes depend on the specific facts of each case. No attorney-client relationship is created by reading this article or contacting Lukov Injury Law LLC. For advice about your situation, contact a qualified attorney. Time limits apply to legal claims, so do not delay in seeking legal help.
